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The Democratic Life of the Union: Toward Equal
Voting Participation for Europeans
with Disabilities
Ja´nos Fiala-Butora*
Michael Ashley Stein**
Janet E. Lord***
This Article puts forward preliminary legal scholarship on equal political participation by persons
with disabilities and what international human rights law requires for its attainment. The goal is to
provoke an informed dialogue on the neglected but fundamental human right to enfranchisement by persons
with disabilities while also acknowledging that a complete and just resolution requires further informa-
tion and reflection.
The Article argues that the fundamental right to vote cannot be curtailed on the basis of an alleged
lack of capacity. Disenfranchisement based on individual assessment unjustly excludes a certain number of
voting-capable individuals. Since all those affected are persons with disabilities, this violates the require-
ment of equality expressed in general international human rights law that recently was explicitly extended
to cover disability.
The Article also pushes the discussion forward by delving into the controversial and unsettling notion of
proxy voting, suggested by philosopher Martha Nussbaum. Although a small number of individuals
cannot currently be accommodated in the electoral process, this does not justify their disenfranchisement.
Nor does it warrant a more intrusive measure, such as voting by proxy. In no circumstance should their
situation justify singling out voting-incapable persons from other individuals or categorizing them differ-
ently before the law.
Although the focus is often seen through a European lens, the questions raised are pertinent for the
exercise of human rights by persons with disabilities around the globe.
Introduction
The right to political participation is so well established by Europe’s con-
stitution1 that the consolidated Treaty of Lisbon proclaims without compro-
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1. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 39–40, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C
83/02) 389.
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mise: “Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life
of the Union.”2 Nevertheless, a significant portion of Europe’s eighty mil-
lion persons with disabilities cannot vote due to prevailing domestic guardi-
anship laws and policies that bar persons with disabilities from exercising
their franchise de jure or that institute inaccessible voting procedures with
similar practical consequences.3
Prospects for changing this decidedly undemocratic situation are buoyed
by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”),4
the first United Nations human rights treaty of the twenty-first century and
the first international human rights instrument ratified by the European
Union (“EU”) as a regional body.5 The CRPD requires full and equal politi-
cal participation by persons with disabilities,6 a fact noted by the European
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) in Kiss v. Hungary when it declared that
a state’s blanket voting restriction imposed upon persons with disabilities
placed under guardianship violated their human rights.7
Kiss is a landmark disability rights decision by the ECtHR. Read broadly,
the ruling sets precedent for lifting general voting restrictions against per-
sons with disabilities across Europe—notably, only eight Council of Europe
member states have not restricted their right to vote—and in state and re-
gional jurisdictions that heed ECtHR jurisprudence.8 Kiss nonetheless leaves
unresolved many complex issues relating to equal political participation by
persons with disabilities. Judicial guidance is absent on the central questions
of whether all disabled persons are entitled to vote despite diminished capa-
bilities, and if not, whether determinations as to which individuals are so
entitled can be made in a manner that does not violate those individuals’
human rights. Given the nearly complete dearth of informative jurispru-
dence or academic writing, as well as the politically controversial nature of
these matters—the majority of state reservations against the CRPD focus on
legal capacity—ECtHR reticence is neither unwise nor unsurprising.9 Yet,
these are crucial human rights questions in need of resolution. Hungarian
2. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 10(3), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83/
01) 20.
3. See generally European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, The Right to Political Participation of
Persons with Mental Health Problems and Persons with Intellectual Disabilities (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter EU
Fundamental Rights].
4. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/
106 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD].
5. Press Release, European Commission, EU Ratifies U.N. Convention on Disability Rights (Jan. 5,
2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/4.
6. CRPD, supra note 4, art. 29.
7. Kiss v. Hungary, No. 38832/06 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., May 20, 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-98800 [hereinafter Kiss].
8. Exclusion of voters with disabilities is a global phenomenon. See Andre´ Blais et al, Deciding Who
Has the Right to Vote: A Comparative Analysis of Election Laws, 20 Electoral Stud. 41, 51 (2001) (stating
that 56 out of 60 countries restricted the right to vote on the basis of disability).
9. Beyond Kiss, no regional human rights tribunal has considered these issues to date. One of the few
scholarly works on point is Martha C. Nussbaum, The Capabilities of People with Cognitive Disabilities, 40
Metaphilosophy 331 (2009).
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citizens with intellectual disabilities recently lodged two applications with
the ECtHR, six complainants won the consolidated case of Bujdoso´ v. Hun-
gary before the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the
CRPD monitoring body) concerning voting prohibitions,10 and there is rea-
son to believe that aggrieved citizens with disabilities from other states will
follow suit. These challenges must be engaged if the fundamental human
rights of Europeans with disabilities (and their worldwide counterparts) are
to be protected at a level equal to that of non-disabled persons, thereby
upholding basic values inherent to democratic societies.
This Article puts forward preliminary legal scholarship on equal political
participation by persons with disabilities and what international human
rights law requires for its attainment. When doing so, it draws on our col-
lective firsthand experience in generating, supporting, and advancing disa-
bility rights issues, including voting, in Europe and elsewhere.11 The goal is
to provoke an informed dialogue on the neglected but fundamental human
right to enfranchisement by persons with disabilities while also acknowledg-
ing that a complete and just resolution requires further information and
reflection. The Article also pushes the discussion forward by delving into the
controversial and unsettling notion of proxy voting. Finally, although the
focus is often seen through a European lens, the questions raised are perti-
nent for the exercise of human rights by persons with disabilities around the
globe.
By way of background, Part I describes the relevant legal frameworks
impacting the right of Europeans with diverse disabilities to vote, the
ground-breaking decision in Kiss, and some of the contentious issues await-
ing resolution in Europe and beyond. Next, Part II argues that even post-
Kiss, the fundamental human right to vote cannot be overcome by a legiti-
mate state desire to protect the integrity of its political process when the
result is wholesale disenfranchisement of entire segments of the disabled
population. It also maintains that state attempts to preclude persons with
disabilities from voting are in contravention of the CRPD and the European
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and do not meet the proportional-
ity standard set forth by the ECtHR. Although Kiss leaves open the theoreti-
10. Harmati v. Hungary, App. No. 63012/10 (submitted to Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 11, 2010) (on file with
authors); Gajsi v. Hungary, App. No. 62924/10 (submitted to Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 11, 2010) (on file with
authors); Submission to United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Zsolt
Bujdoso´, Ja´nosne´ Ildiko´ Ma´rkus, Vikto´ria Ma´rton, Sa´ndor Me´sza´ros, Gergely Polk, and Ja´nos Szabo´ v.
Hungary (submitted to CRPD Committee Sept. 5, 2011) (on file with authors).
11. Stein and Lord participated in the negotiations leading up to the CRPD; Fiala-Butora, Stein, and
Lord collectively have implemented disability rights law and policy programs in some forty countries,
including some fifteen election access programs implemented by Lord in developing countries; Fiala-
Butora represented Kiss throughout the proceedings culminating in the ECtHR decision, and Stein
intervened with an expert brief to the ECtHR (cited in the opinion); Fiala-Butora and Stein, respectively,
as plaintiff’s counsel and Court-approved expert have another six cases currently lodged before the
ECtHR; finally, Fiala-Butora filed six individual complaints against Hungary to the CRPD Committee,
see supra note 10, and Stein submitted a consolidated expert’s brief on the main issues presented therein.
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cal possibility of excluding particular individuals with disabilities from
political participation (“persons incapable of voting”),12 in practice those
efforts fail for being empirically unsupported and over-inclusive. Conse-
quently, persons with disabilities must be accorded the same human right as
all other humans to political participation, and as a result engender similar
challenges and costs to political processes. Part III begins by identifying
tensions between how the CRPD and its advocates on one hand, and other
core human rights treaties and their implementers on the other, would ad-
dress the matter of barring persons incapable of voting from exercising their
franchise. It contends that the current practice of inaction, whereby those
who cannot vote do not vote, is preferable to a proposal by philosopher
Martha Nussbaum whereby guardians are appointed to vote as substitutes
for persons lacking voting capacity. The Article concludes with some
thoughts on the wider issue of ensuring equal legal capacity for persons with
disabilities.
I. Disability, Guardianship, and the Right to Vote
Despite enfranchisement guarantees contained in international and re-
gional human rights treaties, Europeans with disabilities, as well as persons
with disabilities around the world, face statutory and procedural barriers to
voting. Citing the CRPD, the ECtHR in Kiss found wholesale voting re-
strictions arising from guardianship status to be incompatible with the
ECHR, while leaving attendant and complex issues unresolved.
A. Statutory and Procedural Barriers to Voting
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) proclaims “uni-
versal and equal suffrage,” the right of “everyone” to participate in his or
her state’s governance.13 Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that “every citizen shall have the right
and the opportunity” to vote “without unreasonable restrictions.”14 Restric-
tions under the ICCPR are to be strictly construed; they must be prescribed
12. Some national level statutes and court decisions use the imprecise and pejorative term “incompe-
tent” to describe these individuals. See, e.g., Magyarorsza´g Alapto¨rve´nye [Hungary’s Basic Law] art. XX-
III(6) (2011) (allowing the disenfranchisement of persons on the basis of their “limited competence”
(“bela´ta´si ke´pesse´ge´nek korla´tozottsa´ga miatt”)). See also CERMI, Human Rights and Disability, Alternative
Report Spain 2010, ¶ 137 (2010) (allowing disenfranchisement of individuals “incapable of exercising
their right to vote”), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/SPdocs/CRPD/5thsession/CERMI_Spain_
5thSession_en.doc. Instead, we use some variation on “persons incapable of voting” or “persons lacking
voting capacity” to reference the small subset of persons with disabilities who, even with the provision of
reasonable accommodations, functionally cannot exercise their right to vote. For further discussion, see
infra Part II.C.
13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art.
21 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/
6316, art. 25 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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by law, and they must meet objective and reasonable standards.15 At the
European level, the first Protocol to the European Convention on Human
Rights guarantees the right to free elections.16
Yet notwithstanding these assurances, disabled persons remain outside
the universe of individuals whose suffrage is protected by international and
regional human rights instruments.17 In contrast to these exclusionary prac-
tices, the CRPD requires states parties to “ensure that persons with disabili-
ties can effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an
equal basis with others,” including the right to vote.18 When doing so, the
CRPD admits no exception on the basis of disability. That mandate has
been strongly advanced by the treaty monitoring committee’s initial con-
cluding observations, perhaps even beyond the CRPD’s text.19
Within individual member states, explicit and implicit exclusionary prac-
tices can be classified into three categories. The first group includes laws
that allow the disenfranchisement of persons with disabilities in connection
with their placement under guardianship or other restrictions on legal ca-
pacity, irrespective of whether any diminished function they possess is re-
lated to the ability to vote. This approach was permitted fifteen years ago by
a Human Rights Committee General Comment20 and is codified in the na-
tional legislation of sixteen member states, including Bulgaria and other
post-Communist countries, where disenfranchisement is an automatic conse-
15. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25, The right to participate in public affairs, voting
rights, and the right of equal access to public service, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, 1510th Sess.
(Jul. 12, 1996) (“Any conditions which apply to the exercise of the rights protected by article 25 should
be based on objective and reasonable criteria.”) [hereinafter General Comment 25].
16. Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights art. 3, Mar. 20, 1952, 213
U.N.T.S. 226 (requiring state parties “to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under
conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of legislature”)
[hereinafter ECHR]. Although the wording of Article 3 is suggestive of only an institutional guarantee
of free elections, jurisprudence clarifies the guarantee of a representative legislature and attendant voting
rights. See, e.g., Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2) App. No. 74025/01, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 41, ¶ 56
(2005) (reaffirming the guarantee in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the right to vote and to stand for
election); Mathieu-Mohin & Clerfayt v. Belgium, App. No. 9267/81, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 16 (1988)
(interpreting Article 3’s provision of free elections to include a right to vote); Denmark, Norway, Sweden
& Netherlands v. Greece, App. Nos. 3321–3167; 3344/67, 12 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 179 (1969) (Euro-
pean Comm’n Human Rights) (stating that the wording of Article 3 implies a representative legislature,
recognition of the principle of universal suffrage, the right to vote, and the right to stand for election).
17. See generally Blais, supra note 8.
18. CRPD, supra note 4, art. 29.
19. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Spain, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1 (Oct. 19, 2011) available
at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Session6.aspx [hereinafter CRPD Committee Con-
cluding Observations, Spain] (“The Committee recommends that all relevant legislation be reviewed to
ensure that all persons with disabilities, regardless of their impairment, legal status or place of residence,
have the right to vote and participate in public life on an equal basis with others. The Committee
requests the [s]tate party to amend article 3 of Organic Act 5/1985, which allows the denial of the right
to vote based on individualized decisions taken by a judge. The amendment should ensure that all
persons with disabilities have the right to vote.”).
20. See General Comment 25, supra note 15 (“established mental incapacity may be a ground for
denying a person the right to vote”) (emphasis added).
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quence of placement under guardianship.21 The second category permits dis-
ability-based voting bans to follow from specific findings of incapacity to
vote, rather than on determinations of general legal incapacity. Two Council
of Europe instruments condone this method,22 as do a pair of state constitu-
tional courts,23 and the practice prevails in four member states, most promi-
nently Spain.24 The third grouping prohibits any limitation on the right to
vote on the basis of disability. Two recent Council of Europe instruments25
(that seemingly are at odds with the pair of Council Recommendations cited
above) exemplify this last mandate.26 Eight member states provide for uni-
versal suffrage in which all persons, including those under guardianship, can
vote; the Netherlands exemplifies this model.27
B. Kiss v. Hungary
Alajos Kiss was diagnosed with manic-depression in 1991, but he was
only placed under partial guardianship fifteen years later after engaging in
property disputes with his stepfather.28 A Hungarian court found that Kiss
lived alone and “took care of himself adequately,” yet it restricted his legal
capacity on the ground that he “sometimes wasted money in an irresponsi-
21. Guardianship and Human Rights in Bulgaria, Mental Disability Advocacy Center 45 (2007),
available at http://www.mdac.info/sites/mdac.info/files/English_Guardianship_and_Human_Rights_in_
Bulgaria.pdf.
22. See Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R(99)4 on Principles Concerning the
Legal Protection of Incapable Adults, principle 3(2) (1999), available at  http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/
healthbioethic/texts_and_documents/Rec(99)4E.pdf (placement under guardianship or other measures of
protection “should not automatically deprive the person concerned of the right to vote”); Council of
Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R(2004)10 Concerning the Protection of Human
Rights and Dignity of Persons with Mental Disorder, art. 4(2)(2004), available at https://wcd.coe.int/
ViewDoc.jsp?id=775685&Site=CM (requiring that “[a]ny restrictions to the exercise of those rights
should be in conformity with the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and should not be based on the mere fact that a person has a mental disorder”).
23. See Na´lez U´stavnı´ho soudu zed ne 12.07.2010 (U´S) [Decision of the Czech Constitutional Court
of July 12, 2010] no. IV. U´S 3102/08, available at http://nalus.usoud.cz/; Decision of the Slovenian
Constitution Court no. U-I-346/02 from July 10, 2003, available at http://www.us-rs.si/.
24. See CRPD Committee Concluding Observations Spain, supra note 19, at ¶¶ 47–48. The African
Commission on Human Rights took a similar position by rejecting as a violation of human rights the
denial of voting rights to persons detained in a psychiatric hospital. See Purohit & Moore v. The Gambia,
Communication No. 241/2001, ¶ 76 (African Comm’n Hum. Rts., May 29, 2003) (“[I]t is very clear
that there are no objective bases within the legal system of the Respondent State to exclude mentally
disabled persons from political participation.”).
25. Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R(2006)5 on the Council of Europe
Action Plan to Promote the Rights and Full Participation of People with Disabilities in Society: Improv-
ing the Quality of Life of People with Disabilities in Europe 2006–2015 (2006), available at https://
wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=986865; Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation
CM/Rec(2011)14 on the Participation of Persons with Disabilities in Political and Public Life (2011),
available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1871285&Site=CM.
26. For the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendations, see supra note 22.
27. See Stanley S. Herr, Self-Determination, Autonomy and Alternatives for Guardianship, in The Human
Rights of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities: Different but Equal 435, 446 (Stanley S.
Herr et al eds., 2003); see also Grondwet voor het koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Constitution of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands], art. 54 § 2(b) (amended 1983).
28. Kiss, supra note 7, ¶ 7.
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ble fashion and was occasionally aggressive.”29 According to the then-Hun-
garian Constitution—a seminal example of the first exclusionary category
described above—only persons with full legal capacity were permitted to
participate in political processes.30 Consequently, Kiss was struck from the
electoral list and barred from voting in the ensuing national elections as an
automatic consequence of his placement. Unsuccessful in challenging this
disenfranchisement at a local district court, Kiss brought an application to
the ECtHR.31
Neither party disputed the underlying facts; thus, the central issue was
whether disenfranchisement arising from guardianship was compatible with
the manifest human and civil right to vote. According to the ECtHR’s es-
tablished interpretation, suffrage is not absolute and can be restricted by
measures that pursue a legitimate state aim and are proportional in effect.32
The Court accepted Hungary’s argument that devising a rule to exclude
those incapable “of assessing the consequences of their decisions” protected
the integrity of the electoral system,33 but did not address the underlying
assumption that individuals under guardianship were incapable per se of re-
sponsible political choices.
In assessing the proportionality of the interference, the ECtHR estab-
lished a number of factors to be considered. As an initial matter, it rejected
Hungary’s assertion that states should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation
in regulating electoral affairs.34 Instead, the ECtHR ruled that under the
European Convention on Human Rights the “mentally disabled” comprised
a “particularly vulnerable group” such that restrictions on their rights must
be justified by “very weighty reasons.”35 Moreover, because a “significant”
proportion of the Hungarian population of voting age was under guardian-
ship at the relevant time and adversely impacted by the measure,36 Hungary
was not entitled to a wide margin of appreciation in its application.37
29. Id.
30. Id. ¶ 11 (citing A Magyar Ko¨zta´rsasa´g Alkotma´nya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary],
art. 70(5)).
31. Id. ¶ 8.
32. Mathieu-Mohin & Clerfayt v. Belgium, App. No. 9267/81, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶ 52 (1988) 18
(“[States] have a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere, but it is for the Court to determine in the
last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself
that the conditions . . . are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not
disproportionate.”).
33. Kiss, supra note 7, ¶ 38 (“The Government submitted that the measure complained of pursued
the legitimate aim of ensuring that only citizens capable of assessing the consequences of their decisions
and making conscious and judicious decisions should participate in public affairs . . . . The applicant
accepted this view and the Court sees no reason to hold otherwise.”).
34. Id. ¶ 42 (“Indeed, while the Court reiterates that this margin of appreciation is wide, it is not all-
embracing . . . if a restriction on fundamental rights applies to a particularly vulnerable group in society,
who have suffered considerable discrimination in the past, such as the mentally disabled, then the
[s]tate’s margin of appreciation is substantially narrower . . . .”).
35. Id.
36. Id. ¶ 39 (citing a figure of 0.75%).
37. Id. ¶ 41.
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Next, the ECtHR drew on an earlier decision wherein it criticized the
United Kingdom for indiscriminately removing the right of all prisoners to
vote.38 In Hirst v. the United Kingdom, the Court had stressed that disen-
franchisement is a “severe measure” such that proportionality requires a
strong correlation between state action and the affected individual’s
circumstances.39
Applying this requirement, the Kiss court found that the applicant “lost
his right to vote as the result of the imposition of an automatic, blanket
restriction on the franchise of those under partial guardianship.”40 The
ECtHR concluded that “an indiscriminate removal of voting rights, without
an individualized judicial evaluation” predicated solely on guardianship sta-
tus “cannot be considered compatible with the legitimate grounds for re-
stricting the right to vote.”41
C. After Kiss
The ruling in Kiss is significant on several grounds. As an initial matter,
the ECtHR condemned the automatic disenfranchisement of individuals
with disabilities due to their guardianship status.42 Consequently, the
ECtHR declared this practice to be contrary to European human rights law,
with consequences for Hungary and also for other Council of Europe mem-
ber states, the majority of which currently disenfranchise people with disa-
bilities under guardianship.43 Hungary has changed its laws as a result, and
it currently maintains a system of disenfranchisement based on individual-
ized assessment of capacity to vote.44 The decision also sparked off reforms at
38. Id. ¶ 43.
39. Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No. 74025/01, ¶ 77 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
40. Kiss, supra note 7, ¶ 43.
41. Id. ¶ 44.
42. The Court was thus in harmony with earlier judgments rejecting all-or-nothing conceptions of
legal capacity. See, e.g., Salontaji-Drobnjak v. Serbia, No. 36500/05, ¶ 134 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Oct. 13,
2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-94985 (“[T]here has been no com-
prehensive psychiatric examination of the applicant undertaken in this context . . . legislation does not
seem to provide for a periodical judicial reassessment of the applicant’s condition . . . .”); X v. Croatia,
No. 11223/04, ¶ 53 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Jul. 17, 2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-87644 (“[T]he Court has difficulty in accepting that every person divested of capac-
ity to act should be automatically excluded from adoption proceedings concerning his or her child
. . . .”); Shtukaturov v. Russia, No. 44009/05, ¶ 95 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Mar. 27, 2008), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-85611 (stating that Russian legislation did not provide
for a more tailored evaluation of legal capacity, resulting in an overly strict limitation on the applicant’s
rights).
43. Countries with plenary or partial guardianship in place which deny voting rights on that basis
include Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Romania. See EU Fundamental Rights, supra note 3, at 16.
44. Act CCI of 2011 on the Amendment of Certain Acts Related to the Fundamental Law, which
amended, among others, Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code, Act C of 1997 on the Elections Procedure,
and Act III of 1952 on Civil Procedure.
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the EU and national level as well.45 In 2012, Croatia extended the franchise
to all persons with disabilities, including to all persons under guardianship,
who up to that point had been disenfranchised.46
In addition, Kiss marks the first occasion where the ECtHR declared per-
sons with disabilities to be a protected group under the ECHR. In doing so,
the Court determined that future review of state-imposed limitations on the
rights of disabled individuals, both within and beyond the context of politi-
cal participation, will be accorded a narrow margin of appreciation. Finally,
Kiss is the first occasion on which the ECtHR explicitly endorsed the
CRPD’s salience for engaging with the issue of guardianship, a prevailing
legal device amongst European countries.47
More generally, the ruling in Kiss raises the standards for the application
of human rights to persons with disabilities beyond Europe. By endorsing
the CRPD’s treatment of equal access to voting, the ECtHR implicitly
forces a reconsideration of now-outdated norms and practices. This is as true
for General Comments—such as that of the Human Rights Committee on
voting48—as it is for domestic constitutional courts heeding ECtHR juris-
prudence and for regional bodies (for example, the Inter-American Commis-
sion for Human Rights) seeking to apply the most advanced standards to
human rights areas.
However, although clearly a groundbreaking decision, the ruling in Kiss
leaves more issues unresolved than it answers.49 Kiss categorically forbids
disenfranchisement without an individualized assessment of each person’s
capacity to vote, but can a state nonetheless lawfully restrict disabled citi-
45. On the EU level, the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency took the lead by commissioning a study
of human rights requirement related to voting rights of persons with disabilities. See European Funda-
mental Rights, supra note 3.
46. The Act on Registers of Voters (Zakon o registru birae`a, NN 144/12) was adopted on 14 December
2012.
47. The Harvard Law School Project on Disability, which intervened as a third party in the case,
raised the relevance of the CRPD, and argued that the European Court should take it into account when
developing its standards for persons with disabilities. Kiss, supra note 7, ¶ 34 (“The intervener empha-
sized that the prohibition in question was. . .not in compliance with Articles 12 and 29 of the CRPD
. . . .”). It is important that the first application of the CRPD as a controlling standard was raised in the
sensitive area of guardianship. Glor v. Switzerland, No. 13444/04 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Apr. 30, 2009),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-92525, is the first time the European Court
referred to the CRPD.
48. See General Comment 25, supra note 15, ¶ 4. The HRC’s General Comment, adopted in 1996, is
now under consideration for revision due to the apparent conflict between its sweeping denials of voting
rights based upon guardianship status and CRPD provisions explicitly protecting political participation
by persons with disabilities.
49. This is not an uncommon phenomenon. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of
Education and the Civil Rights Movement 79 (2007) (stating that while Brown invalidated school
segregation, it did not address the important issue of the process of desegregation). Within the disability
law field, commentators have similarly criticized the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Olmstead requiring
that persons with disabilities be placed in their communities in the most integrated settings. See, e.g.,
Laura F. Rothstein, Reflections on Disability Discrimination Policy—25 Years, 22 U. Ark. Little Rock L.
Rev. 147, 156–57 (2000) (opining that the Olmstead Court left unresolved issues such as how the cost-
based defense is to be applied and how states are to prioritize service provision).
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zens after such a particularized examination? And if so, on what ground can
states legitimately base such a decision? Consequently, states, disabled peo-
ple’s organizations, and human rights advocates have been left to grapple
with crucial and complex issues directly impacting the fundamental human
right of voting.50 The remainder of this Article provides insight for address-
ing these key issues.
II. Equal Access to Voting
Political participation is acknowledged as a fundamental human right,
but one that historically has not been realized due to social conventions
about the perceived inabilities of various groups of individuals. Under the
CRPD, persons with disabilities must be accorded the same access to politi-
cal participation as all other persons, and so their capacity must equally be
presumed. States also have an affirmative duty to accommodate and support
persons with disabilities in the realization of the right to political participa-
tion. At the same time, international human rights law generally requires
that interference with individual rights, including voting, be strictly con-
strued. Thus, taking disability into account, even in the narrowest possible
manner—as would be the case of disenfranchisement on the basis of individ-
ual assessments of “voting capacity”—is equally prohibited because these
assessments invariably lead to unjustified exclusions of some number of dis-
abled persons with voting capacity. Indeed, due to embedded societal
prejudices, all currently available assessments produce distorted and dispro-
portionate outcomes that violate international law. Hence, states may not
legally disenfranchise persons on the basis of disability, guardianship, indi-
vidual assessments of capacity or other similar proxy.
A. Voting and Social Constructs
Voting is an axiomatic and fundamental human right, as acknowledged
by the UDHR,51 the ICCPR,52 the ECHR53 and numerous human rights
instruments, monitoring bodies, and commentators.54 Indeed, the routine
50. Another crucial issue—and one that goes beyond the scope of this article—is the positive obliga-
tion placed by the CRPD on states to enable political participation by persons with disabilities through
facilitative mechanisms.
51. UDHR, supra note 13, art. 21.
52. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 25.
53. ECHR, Protocol 1, supra note 16, art. 3. See also Denmark, Norway, Sweden & Netherlands v.
Greece, App. Nos. 3321-3167; 3344/67, 1968 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 690 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.)
(clarifying the content of Article 3 of Protocol 1 as including the right to vote).
54. E.g., American Convention on Human Rights art. 23(1), opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123; Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation 2 (2005),
available at http://www.ndi.org/files/1923_declaration_102705_0.pdf (stating that the presence of uni-
versal and equal suffrage is a fundamental democratic right); International Electoral Standards: Guidelines
for reviewing the legal framework of elections, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
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assumption is that when persons reach a specific age they are expected (and
even in some jurisdictions, required) to exercise their franchise.55
Nevertheless, nearly every state has at some time in its history restricted
the basic human right of voting for women, ethnic and racial minorities,
immigrants, persons with low literacy levels, and/or persons with disabili-
ties.56 Common to these exclusions are justifications that are grounded in
deeply embedded but empirically unfounded social constructs as to the
lesser ability of the given category of individuals.57 For example, recent dis-
cussions in the Slovakian Parliament revealed strong support for disen-
franchising Roma voters or, at a minimum, those who are illiterate.58 With
time, most of these unsupported exclusions have been eliminated.59
People with disabilities, however, are among the last identity groups to
have been acknowledged as a protected human rights population by the in-
Assistance 34 (2002), available at http://www.idea.int/publications/ies/ (“One clear international stan-
dard which must be provided for is the guarantee of universal and equal suffrage to each adult citizen.”).
55. See Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, Contingent Participation and Coercive Care: Feminist and
Communitarian Theories Consider Disability and Legal Capacity, in Coercive Care; Rights, Law and
Policy (Bernadette McSherry & Ian Freckelton eds. 2013). Some twenty states have in place compulsory
voting procedures, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Singapore, Ecuador and Peru, among others.
See Compulsory Voting Around the World, Electoral Commission (June 2006), available at http://www.
electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0020/16157/ECCompVotingfi-
nal_22225-16484__E__N__S__W__.pdf [hereinafter Electoral Commission].
56. See Adam Przeworski, Conquered or Granted? A History of Suffrage Extensions, 39 B.J. Pol. S. 291,
291 (2009) (stating that many representative governments began with greatly restricted political rights,
only gradually extending suffrage to women, minorities, and lower and middle class). Such restrictions
on the franchise continue to be present even in the modern era. See, e.g., Aoife Nolan, ‘Aggravated Viola-
tions’, Roma Housing Rights and Forced Expulsions in Italy: Recent Development under the European Social Charter
Collective Complaints System, 11 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 343, 355 (2011) (detailing how Italy’s failure to
facilitate access to identification for the nation’s Roma minority often leads to discriminatory treatment
and exclusion from the right to vote); Hassan M. Fattah, Kuwait Grants Political Rights to Its Women, N.Y.
Times, May 17, 2005, at A9 (“Kuwait’s Parliament granted full political rights to women on Monday,
making way for them to vote and run for office . . . for the first time in the country’s history.”).
57. The modern avatar posits genetically-based justifications. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein & Anita
Silvers, Essentially Empirical: The Role of Biological and Legal Classification in Effectively Prohibiting Genetic
Discrimination, in Science and Other Cultures: Issues in Philosophies of Science and Technol-
ogy 129 (Robert Figueroa & Sandra Harding eds., 2003).
58. Presentation by Radoslav Procha´zka, Chair of the Slovak National Assembly’s Committee for
Constitutional Law, Human Rights–Back to the Foundations (Dec. 5, 2011) (mentioning private bills
submitted by some members of parliament aimed at restricting the right to vote on the basis of educa-
tion); see also Vnu´tro ma´ vypracovatt’ analy´zu, e`i mozˇno obmedzit’ volebne´ pra´vo [Ministry of Internal Affairs has
to prepare an analysis about whether it is possible to limit the right to vote], SME [Slovakian daily], Mar.
21, 2011 (translation by authors).
59. See, e.g., Women in Kuwait Get Vote, N.Y. Times (May 17, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2005/05/16/world/africa/16iht-Kuwait.html?_r=0; Press Release, Inter-Parliamentary Union, IPU
Welcomes Saudi Arabia’s Decision to grant to Women the Right to Vote and Stand for Election (Sept. 26, 2001),
available at http://www.ipu.org/press-e/gen353.htm (indicating Saudi women were granted the right to
vote and be elected in limited municipal elections). Regrettably, many restrictions in many countries
remain. See No Voice: The Exclusion of Women from Voting, Democracy Reporting International (July
2011), available at http://www.democracy-reporting.org/files/dri_briefing_paper_15-_no_voice-_the_ex-
clusion_of_women_from_voting.pdf (detailing voting exclusions against women in Pakistan).
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ternational community.60 Their stark omission was raised in a report issued
by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights61 that in
turn lent political support for the General Assembly to authorize considera-
tion of a disability-specific treaty, the eventual CRPD.62 However, disabled
persons still remain near the end of the queue of vulnerable population
groups to be accorded equality, their current exclusion mirroring the histor-
ical treatment of other groups of individuals perceived as biologically differ-
ent.63 Within the realm of voting, people with disabilities are even more
neglected than peer identity groups due to prevailing laws and policies that
are still enforced.64 Yet, in all these cases, law has been the vehicle through
which socially contingent restrictions were held out as objectively deter-
mined, with the asserted lesser abilities of respective groups couched in
terms of neutral scientific principles that in turn prescribed appropriate so-
60. See Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 75, 85–93 (2007) (recounting
both the absence of disability and its contingent nature when included in international human rights
instruments). Sexual minorities are prominent among those who remain neglected. See id. at 113–16.
61. Gerard Quinn et al., Human Rights and Disability: The Current and Future Potential of United Nations
Human Rights Instruments in the Context of Disability (2002), available at www.nhri.net/pdf/disability.pdf.
See also Leandro Despouy, Report on Human Rights and Disabled Persons, ¶¶ 280–81 (1993) (noting that
“persons with disabilities are going to find themselves at a legal disadvantage in relation to other vulner-
able groups” because “unlike the other vulnerable groups, they do not have an international control body
to provide them with particular and specific protection”).
62.  See Michael Ashley Stein & Janet E. Lord, Future Prospects for the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disa-
bilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives, 22–23 (Gerard Quinn & Oddny Mjo¨ll
Arnardo´ttir eds., 2009).
63. See Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimina-
tion, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 579, 609–15 (2004) (analogizing to race and sex the historical treatment of
persons with disabilities in the United States on the basis of biological difference).
64. Perhaps only convicted felons face an equivalent level of exclusion and there the argument is that
they ought to forfeit the franchise for political reasons, not because they are perceived as incapable of
voting. In 1960, the ECtHR held that restrictions on the right of convicted prisoners to vote do not
violate their rights under Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR. See X v. Federal Republic of Germany,
App. No. 530/59, 1960 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 184 (Eur. Ct. of H.R.). However, in 2006, the Court held
in Hirst v. United Kingdom that while such bans on prisoners can serve a legitimate purpose, the United
Kingdom’s ban was disproportionate and indiscriminate, and that “[s]uch a general, automatic and in-
discriminate restriction on a vitally important Convention right must be seen as falling outside any
acceptable margin of appreciation, however wide that margin might be, and as being incompatible with
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.” See Hirst, supra note 16. See also Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05,
(May 22, 2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-111044 (af-
firming Hirst and holding that general, automatic and indiscriminate disenfranchisement of all serving
prisoners, irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offences, is incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol
No. 1 (right to free elections) whilst accepting the argument that each state has a wide discretion as to
how it regulates the ban). The Court’s judgment in Hirst indicated that prisoners may frequently or
sometimes vote in 13 countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta,
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania and Turkey. Id. The Court’s judgment also indicated that
prisoners cannot vote in another 13 countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Russia, Slovakia and the United Kingdom. Id. The ECHR
has further held that restrictions on the voting rights of nationals who reside abroad are permissible. See
X and others v. Belgium, App. No. 1065/61, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 260 (Eur. Comm’n H.R.).
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cial roles for given groups of persons, the attendant exclusions bolstered by
law.65
Ironically—and pointedly—political participation is one of the key ave-
nues through which marginalized groups most effectively seek equality. Par-
ticipation in decisionmaking is regarded as fundamental to human rights
realization for persons with disabilities, serving to amplify their voice and
create visibility, not only in an electoral process but beyond. Hence, disen-
franchising persons with disabilities reinforces barriers for the group’s abil-
ity to advocate for change through existing political processes and is
inimical to the principles that animate human rights in the context of disa-
bility—autonomy, non-discrimination, inclusion, participation, equality of
opportunity, and respect for difference.
B. The CRPD’s Participatory Mandates
The CRPD is a holistic human rights instrument that prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability and also contains measures to ensure that
persons with disabilities are able to achieve full enjoyment of their human
rights and fundamental freedoms.66 The EU ratified the CRPD as a regional
integration organization, which in turn binds its member states to the ex-
tent of EU competence.67 This marked the first time the EU acceded to a
human rights treaty as an overarching entity. Many European countries,
both individual member states of the EU, and those outside its purview,
have likewise ratified the CRPD.68 These states have to comply with both
the CRPD and the ECHR. For that reason, although the CRPD is not bind-
ing on the ECtHR, the European Court refers to the CRPD in informing its
own standards under the ECHR.69
Article 29 of the CRPD requires states parties to “ensure that persons
with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in political and public
life on an equal basis with others,” including “the right and opportunity” of
voting.70 Read both on its own and in conjunction with Article 3 (General
65. For a discussion of application of this schema by the United States Supreme Court, see Anita
Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads
of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, 35 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 81 (2002).
66. Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 Hum. Rts. Rev. 1, 2, n.4 (2008).
67. See CRPD, supra note 4, art. 42 (“The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States
and by regional integration organizations at United Nations Headquarters in New York as of 30 March
2007.”). For a discussion of the competences of the EU in connection with CRPD ratification, see Lisa
Waddington, The European Union and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Story of
Exclusive and Shared Competences, 18 Maastricht J. 411 (2011).
68. See Status on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, United Nations Treaty
Collection, available at http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
15&chapter=4&lang=en (reporting 158 signatories and 138 parties, including 43 European countries
and all European Union member countries).
69. The first decision referring to the CRPD was Glor v. Switzerland, supra note 47.
70. CRPD, supra note 4, art. 29.
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principles),71 Article 4 (General obligations),72 and Article 5 (Equality and
non-discrimination),73 Article 29 reveals that the CRPD unequivocally pro-
hibits exclusionary practices on the basis of disability.74
Moreover, read in conjunction with Article 12 on legal capacity, Article
29 requires states parties to facilitate voting rights and to support decision-
making for all persons with disabilities in the context of political participa-
tion, and Article 5 incorporates a duty to provide reasonable accommodation
in the realization of all rights, including voting accommodations.75 Such
measures might include, for example, the provision of assisted voting by a
designee selected by the voter requiring assistance, access to off-site or alter-
native voting venues, the availability of sign language interpreters, the in-
troduction of tactile ballot guides or accessible electronic voting machines or
the supply of plain language voting procedure instructions.76 Support in this
context applies to the entirety of the electoral process: voter information and
education, registration, site selection, election campaigns, ballot casting,
voter observation, and post-election assessment. The CRPD likewise re-
quires states parties to take proactive measures to ensure that voters with
disabilities can exercise their rights. This is as true in terms of providing
accessible formats under both Article 29 (political participation) and Article
9 (accessibility) as it is of Article 12’s general directive to facilitate the legal
capacity of persons with disabilities.
The CRPD, much like the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR, does
not specify exceptions to the full and equal enjoyment of human rights by
persons with disabilities.77 Still, as an international human rights treaty, the
CRPD is part and parcel of the overall human rights law scheme and must
be understood within that context. By the same token, the CRPD informs
human rights law insofar as it clarifies the application of human rights to
the specific context of persons with disabilities.78 Significantly, the CRPD
Committee, the body entrusted with implementing the treaty, has cast seri-
ous doubt on the permissibility of restrictions on the basis of disability in its
concluding observations on the first state reports it reviewed, those submit-
ted by Tunisia and Spain. The CRPD Committee urged those states to
adopt legislative measures to ensure enfranchisement by persons with disa-
71. Id. art. 3.
72. Id. art. 4(3).
73. Id. art. 5.
74. This is expressed in several contexts. See, e.g., id. art. 5(2) (“States Parties shall prohibit all dis-
crimination on the basis of disability and guarantee to persons with disabilities equal and effective legal
protection against discrimination on all grounds.”).
75. See id. art. 5(3).
76. For more detailed discussion and examples of election access measures to facilitate participation in
the electoral process by persons with disabilities, see Janet E. Lord et al., Human Rights. YES!
Action and Advocacy on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 31–43 (2d ed. 2012).
77. See CRPD, supra note 4, art. 4(5); ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 50; UDHR, supra note 13, art. 30.
78. See Lord & Stein, supra note 55, at 149 (discussing how a disability rights-based paradigm invokes
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights to a greater degree and in conjunction more than
conventional paradigms).
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bilities,79 and it castigated Spain for permitting individual assessments of
voters with disabilities.80 In addition, the General Comment on Article 12
recently issued by the CRPD Committee underscores that “the person’s de-
cision-making ability cannot be used to justify any exclusion of persons with
disabilities from . . . the right to vote.”81 This was also highlighted by the
recent decision of Bujdoso´ and 5 others v. Hungary, in which the Committee
held that disenfranchisement is contrary to Article 29 even if based on an
individual assessment of voting capacity.82
In sum, the CRPD confirms that persons with disabilities are entitled to
the same right to enfranchisement as persons without disabilities, and that
this right applies to persons historically perceived as incapable of voting.
The next sections therefore argue that under current circumstances states
cannot prevail in excluding “incapable” voters with disabilities under the
guise of protecting the legitimacy of political processes.
C. Rationales for Disability-Based Exclusion
States seeking to disenfranchise persons with disabilities have done so on
the ground that such exclusions are essential to protect the legitimacy of
their respective democratic processes.83 For example, in Kiss, Hungary
claimed that individuals placed under guardianship needed to be excluded
from voting. Otherwise, the authenticity of its political system would be
undermined in the eyes of the general populace.84 More specifically, states
have argued that excluding the entire category of persons placed under
guardianship from exercising their franchise is required in order to avoid
fraudulent, manipulated, and/or incompetent voting.85
79. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on Tunisia, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/TUN/CO/1 (May 13, 2011)
(“The Committee recommends the urgent adoption of legislative measures to ensure that persons with
disabilities, including persons who are currently under guardianship or trusteeship, can exercise their
right to vote and participate in public life, on an equal basis with others.”); CRPD Committee Conclud-
ing Observations, Spain, supra note 19, ¶¶ 47–48 (“The Committee recommends that all relevant legis-
lation be reviewed to ensure that all persons with disabilities regardless of their impairment . . . have the
right to vote and participate in public life . . . .”).
80. CRPD Committee Concluding Observations, Spain, supra note 19, ¶ 47 (“The Committee is
concerned that the right to vote of persons with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities can be restricted
if the person concerned has been deprived of his or her legal capacity, or has been placed in an institution.
It is further concerned that the deprivation of this right appears to be the rule and not the exception. It
regrets the lack of information on standards of evidence or grounds, and criteria used by judges when
depriving persons of their right to vote. It notes with concern the number of persons with disabilities
denied their right to vote.”).
81. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Draft General Comment on Article 12 of the
Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, ¶ 44 (September 2–13, 2013).
82. Bujdoso´, supra note 10.
83. See Pamela S. Karlan, Framing the Voting Rights Claims of Cognitively Impaired Individuals, 38 Mc-
George L. Rev. 917, 925 (2007).
84. Kiss, supra note 7, ¶ 25–26.
85. See Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court no. U-I-346/02 from July 10, 2003, available
at http://www.us-rs.si/; see also Na´lez U´stavnı´ho soudu ze dne 12.07.2010 (U´S) [Decision of the Czech
Constitutional Court on July 12, 2010] no. IV. U´S 3102/08, available at http://nalus.usoud.cz/. Cf.
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Sparse data exists on electoral fraud,86 and we are unaware of any research
demonstrating fraud specifically involving persons with disabilities.87 Ab-
sent empirical evidence that persons with disabilities are either generally
susceptible or relatively more prone to becoming victims of fraud, the as-
sumed connection between disabled voters and fraudulent voting must be
attributed to state prejudice and stigma. Indeed, unfounded but deeply held
beliefs define stereotypes.88 There is no evidence of fraudulent voting prac-
tices specifically involving disabled voters,89 despite the prevalence of con-
cerns that large numbers of disabled voters are isolated in institutions where
their contact with the outside world is limited and where their dependence
on care providers is heightened.90 Moreover, to the extent that these invol-
untary residents are at risk of becoming targets for would-be perpetrators of
voter fraud, that possibility is not specific to disabled persons. The same risk
arises from placing any group of individuals in an isolated and heavily con-
trolled living environment. It would be bizarre to remedy one human rights
violation—the segregation of persons with disabilities—with another. As a
result, while fraud is a legitimate state concern, in the absence of any spe-
cific evidence to the contrary, disenfranchising individuals on the basis of
their disability categorically violates their human rights and cannot be justi-
fied under any international legal standard.91
State concerns regarding electoral manipulation, a variation of electoral
fraud, are predicated on the belief that it is easier to unduly influence per-
sons with disabilities than others.92 As in the case of fraud, we are unaware
of any empirical evidence supporting the notion that individuals with disa-
Deborah Markowitz, Voting and Cognitive Impairments: An Election Administrator’s Perspective, 38 Mc-
George L. Rev. 871, 905 (2007) (describing the features of the Canadian electoral system that work to
reduce the risk of fraud committed against people with cognitive impairment who are allowed to vote).
86. Nina A. Kohn, Preserving Voting Rights in Long-Term Care Institutions: Facilitating Resident Voting
While Maintaining Election Integrity, 38 McGeorge L. Rev. 1065, 1076 (2007) (“While the potential
exists for fraud in nursing home voting, evidence of its occurrence is minimal and largely anecdotal.”).
Indeed, empirical evidence of fraud is generally lacking. See Aviva Shen, Colorado Secretary of State Gives
Up On Voter Purge, ThinkProgress, (Sept. 11, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/
09/11/826661/colorado-secretary-of-state-gives-up-on-voter-purge/?mobile=nc (reporting the decision
of Colorado Secretary of State Scott Gessler to end a voter purge, originally initiated by asking for proof
of citizenship from 4000 voters. Approximately 90% of those asked were verified either through response
or through a federal database before the Secretary of State ended the purge.).
87. Kohn, supra note 86, at 1077–78 (stating that, while there have been several high-profile cases
alleging nursing home residents’ ballots were improperly completed, there have been no systemic studies
of voting fraud in long-term care facilities).
88. Rebecca J. Cook & Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Per-
spectives 9 (2010).
89. Kohn, supra note 86, at 1078 (stating that most reports of voter fraud in nursing homes cannot be
substantiated and residents with dementia have not been targeted by perpetrators of voter fraud).
90. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Regional Office for Europe, Forgotten Europeans,
Forgotten Rights: The Human Rights of Persons Placed in Institutions (by Camilla Parker) (2010).
91. See, e.g., Shantha Rau Barriga, Democracy Disabled: Discrimination at the Polls, Human Rights
Watch (May 20, 2011), www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/20/democracy-disabled-discrimination-polls.
92. See Interview with La´szlo´ Sze´kely, Hungarian Government Commissioner for Civil Code Reform,
in Budapest, Hung. (Aug. 26, 2011) (on file with authors).
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bilities are more susceptible to manipulation than the general population.93
Undue influences are ubiquitous and inevitable in democratic voting
processes.94 Voters in open societies are exposed to divergent sources of in-
formation and will diverge on the reasons for their voting decisions.95 Some
base their choices on promised policies and programs. Others choose on the
basis of their family’s longstanding political affiliation, the candidate’s hair-
style or other personal characteristics, or the artistic qualities of the adver-
tisements.96 Many rely on the advice of their family members, friends, and
other associates.97 These are all permissible forms of influence that a state
cannot and should not attempt to control. Any effort to control these forms
of influence would contravene the right to freedom of information.98
No justification exists to treat people with disabilities materially differ-
ently in this context; non-disabled voters are similarly susceptible to a wide
range of undue influences. Some may argue that disability often limits access
to information, which in turn impedes voter decisionmaking. However, in-
93. See Kohn, supra note 86, at 1079 (“[W]hen fraud occurs, it targets nursing home residents in
general and not simply those residents suffering from diminished mental capacity.”).
94. See, e.g., Paul Allen Beck & M. Kent Jennings, Family Traditions, Political Periods, and the Develop-
ment of Partisan Orientations, 53 J. of Politics 742, 742 (1991) (asserting that one of the most impor-
tance influences on adult political orientation is the family); Cameron Ross, Regional Elections and Electoral
Authoritarianism in Russia, 63 Europe-Asia Stud. 641, 654 (2011) (noting the Russian practice of hav-
ing school class leaders call parents in order to pressure them to vote); Ann Zimmerman & Kris Maher,
Wal-Mart Warns of Democratic Win, Wall St. J. (Aug. 1, 2008), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB121755649066303381.html (detailing Wal-Mart employer attempts to implicitly manage employees’
voting patterns in the 2008 U.S. presidential election).
95. See, e.g., Kevin Arceneaux, Do Campaigns Help Voters Learn? A Cross-National Analysis, 36 Brit. J.
Pol. S. 159, 162 (2005) (noting that voters with less political sophistication tend to glean more informa-
tion from political campaigns); Jeffery J. Mondak, Media Exposure and Political Discussion in U.S. Elections,
57 J. of Politics 62, 83 (1995) (“[M]ost voters cast a wide net when endeavoring to acquire political
information. Voters do pay some attention to news reports, debates, and campaign advertisements, but
voters also elicit relevant information from everyday life . . . with resulting influence on electoral
choice.”).
96. See Lynda Lee Kaid et al., Political Communication in European Parliamentary Elec-
tions 93–94 (Michaela Maier et al. eds., 2011) (stating that exposure to television advertisements that
include an entertainment element can produce a marked change in young German voters’ attitudes);
Alexander Todorov et al., Inferences of Competence from Faces Predict Election Outcomes, 308 Sci. 1623, 1623
(2005) (“[I]nferences of competence, based solely on the facial appearance of political candidates and with
no prior knowledge about the person, [can] predict the outcomes of elections for the U.S. Congress.”); see
also Beck & Jennings, supra note 94, at 759 (“[C]hildren from highly politicized families were most
likely to carry the family partisan tradition with them . . . .”).
97. See Paul Allen Beck et. al, The Social Calculus of Voting: Interpersonal, Media, and Organizational
Influences on Presidential Choices, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 57, 64 (2002) (stating that a candidate favored by
an individual’s personal network is more likely to have an advantage in the individual’s own mind);
Mondak, supra note 95, at 83 (suggesting that an individual’s political leanings may influence the electo-
ral decisions of those with whom they converse, regardless of whether the conversation focuses on politi-
cal campaigns).
98. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 19; UDHR, supra note 13, art. 19; see also Toby Mendel, Freedom
of Information: A Comparative Legal Survey 4 (2003) (asserting that effective participation in
elections is dependent on the freedom to access information through a variety of methods); Iran: New
Assault on Freedom of Information, Human Rights Watch (Jan. 25, 2012), available at www.hrw.org/
news/2012/01/25/iran-new-assault-freedom-information (condemning Iran’s arrest of journalists and
bloggers as a violation of the right to freedom of information with regard to elections).
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adequate access to education and information is not a sound basis upon
which to erect additional barriers to rights. Consequently, excluding persons
with disabilities from exercising their human right to political participation
because of unsubstantiated presumptions arising from their disability status
cannot be justified under international law. Rather, governments concerned
about undue influence should ensure that persons with disabilities have ac-
cess to education and information from diverse sources in a form that they
can use. Governments can also implement safeguards limiting the possibil-
ity of undue influence in the voting process.
Alleged lack of voting capacity (retrogressively called “incompetence”) is
probably the most prevalent justification states provide when disenfranchis-
ing persons with disabilities.99 For example, Hungary rationalized its actions
in Kiss by asserting that the people with disabilities who are placed under
guardianship, much like children, are inherently not “capable of making
conscious and judicious decisions.”100 However, adults with disabilities are
not children.101 Most adults with disabilities, much like the general voting
public without disabilities, are able to vote.102 This is true even of many
persons placed under guardianship, who also form a highly heterogeneous
group with varying capacities. As Kiss held, guardianship is simply not a
good enough proxy for restricting voting rights because it is grossly over-
inclusive and therefore targets a large number of individuals whose voting
capacity is intact.103 That some persons with disabilities may require assis-
tance with managing finances ought not to create any presumptions as to
their ability to vote.104
Nevertheless, it is true that some percentage of persons with disabilities is
unable to exercise their right to vote, even with assistance. Often this is
caused by the interplay between those individuals’ impairments and inacces-
sible voting environments. When that is the case, providing reasonable ac-
commodations—such as decisionmaking facilitation, physical access, or
alternative formats—can allow those persons currently viewed as lacking
99. Jason H. Karlawish & Richard J. Bonnie, Voting by Elderly Persons with Cognitive Impairment: Lessons
from Other Democratic Nations, 38 McGeorge L. Rev. 879, 884 (2007).
100. Kiss, supra note 7, ¶ 25.
101. According to disability rights advocates, the infantilization of adults with disabilities has been a
significant rationale for stripping away autonomy. See Mitchell Levitz, Voices of Self Advocates, in The
Human Rights of Persons With Intellectual Disabilities, Different but Equal 453, 458
(Stanley S. Herr et al eds., 2003) (stating that the tendency to deprive individuals with intellectual
disabilities of their right to make their own choices decreases their self-determination and autonomy); see
also Shantha Rau Barriga, From Paternalism to Dignity, Human Rights Watch (2012), available at http:/
/www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/paternalism-dignity (discussing how Argentinean women and girls
with disabilities are often infantilized in the health system and deprived of their capacity to make deci-
sions for themselves).
102. See infra Part II.C.
103. Kiss, supra note 7, ¶ 39.
104. Kiss, supra note 7, ¶ 44; see also Herr, supra note 27, at 433–36 (explaining that the Swedish
system of support for individuals with intellectual disabilities acknowledges the varying forms of assis-
tance such individuals may require while still ensuring they maintain the right to vote).
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voting capacity to participate equally in exercising their franchise. However,
providing reasonable accommodations will not enable every person currently
deemed incapable of voting to render a vote. At the end of the day, some
small percentage will not be able to do so. Indeed, some persons will be
unable to exercise their franchise even with the most extensive forms of facil-
itation currently available. Persons in a persistent vegetative state (i.e., a
coma) are an obvious example and perhaps the only clear one. Persons in
later stages of dementia, those undergoing a severe psychotic attack, or those
with significant intellectual disabilities are other candidates, although we
note that these categories (and their implied considerations) are more am-
biguous. There is no objective cut-off point based on diagnosis or IQ score
below which all persons could be safely declared to lack the capacity to vote.
Even persons with the types of disabilities listed vary in their abilities due to
differing levels of education, training, experience, familiarity with the social
environment, and other factors.105 Lack of capacity to vote is thus individual,
but in some cases it nevertheless exists, and we are most likely to find it
within these categories of persons.
In sum, a generalized approach to persons with disabilities cannot justify
their disenfranchisement. There is no evidence that supports the view that
this subset of the population is more likely to be targeted by would-be per-
petrators of voter fraud or is easier to influence due to their disability. Nor
could they, as a group, be characterized as incapable of voting. Therefore
general exclusionary measures, whether based on disability or guardianship
status, are grossly over-inclusive and impermissible. There is some small
category of individuals with disabilities, however, who do lack the capacity
to vote, in the sense that they currently cannot be accommodated reasonably
(or extra-reasonably) in the voting process and are therefore unable to exer-
cise their right to vote. How the discussed rationales of exclusion apply to
their individual situation merits further attention.
D. Permissibility of Interferences with the Right to Vote
Under international law, state restrictions and limitations on the exercise
of human rights are narrowly construed, if allowed at all. Additionally, cer-
tain human rights—for example, rights to be free from slavery and to be free
from torture—are non-derogable and thus cannot be suspended or subject to
derogation in times of emergency.106 Political participation rights have gen-
105. Mental Disability Advocacy Center, A kiza´ro´ gondnoksa´g ke´rde´se az u´j Ptk.-ban [The question
of plenary guardianship in the new Civil Code], 31 March 2008, 1.
106. See ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 4 (“In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the State Parties to the present Covenant may
take measures derogating from their obligations to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under interna-
tional law and do not involve discrimination . . . . No derogation from Article 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and
2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision.”).
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erally not been found to fall into this latter category of non-derogable
rights.107
Restrictions and limitations on human rights are, like derogation itself,
subject to strict interpretation. The overarching rule requires protection of
the freedom at issue and restriction is the exception.108 Under international
law, state restrictions on the exercise of human rights are permissible only if
they meet a narrow and strict standard: each abridgment must be prescribed
by law and objectively justified on one or more specified grounds.109 Thus,
the restriction must pursue an acceptable aim and must be necessary to
achieve that objective without unduly restricting the right in question.110
The ECtHR, both in Kiss and elsewhere, uses the terms “legitimate aim”
and “necessary in a democratic society” in its analyses when annunciating
this standard.111 Neither prong, however, can currently be satisfied in the
context of restricting voting by persons with disabilities.
i. Legitimate Aims for Permissible Restrictions
Under the ECHR and international human rights law generally, any re-
strictions on rights, whether general or particular, must be justified. That is,
they must comply with the qualifying provision specifying the right’s possi-
ble limitations. Particularly, they must pursue an aim considered a legiti-
mate ground for the restriction—such interests include, for example,
107. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 25; African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
art. 13(1), June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58. A notable exception is the
American Convention on Human Rights which identifies political rights amongst the higher classifica-
tion norm. American Convention on Human Rights, American Convention on Human Rights,
art. 23 (2), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (“The law may regulate
the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in the preceding paragraph only on the basis of
age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil and mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent
court in criminal proceedings.”).
108. Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737 (1975). It is worth
quoting in the context of free speech:
The questions which then fall to be considered are the needs or objectives of a democratic
society in relation to freedom of expression; for without a notion of such needs the limitations
essential to support them cannot be evaluated. . . . The aim is to have a pluralistic, open,
tolerant society. . . . Of necessity this involves a delicate balance . . . But democratic societies
approach the problem from the standpoint of the importance of the individual and the undesir-
ability of restricting the individual’s freedom. Id. ¶¶ 146–48.
109. The limitations clause in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
most succinctly captures the current position, wherein “the State may subject such rights only to such
limitation as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these
rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.” International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 4, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
110. See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 1, art. 52; Convention
on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, arts. 13–15; ICCPR, supra note 14, arts.
18–23; ECHR, supra note 16, arts. 8–18.
111. See ECHR, supra note 16, arts. 2–11; Kiss, supra note 7, ¶ 37–38; see also The Sunday Times v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, ¶ 67 (1979); Handyside v. United King-
dom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737 ¶ 176 (1975).
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national security, public safety, territorial integrity, and public health.112
Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR (which covers an implied right to vote)
contains no qualifying provision, such that the ECtHR’s jurisprudence
might embrace a wide range of aims as justifying limitation.113
In the case of excluding incapable voters, the ECtHR accepted in Kiss that
the measure undertaken by Hungary served the legitimate aim of ensuring
that only citizens capable of “making conscious and judicious decisions” are
allowed to vote.114 In other words, states are in principle permitted to pro-
tect the integrity of their electoral systems from incapable voters. Yet,
neither the Hungarian government, nor the Court referred to the possibility
of incapable voters influencing electoral outcomes. Therefore, they presuma-
bly consider any vote cast by incapable voters as per se harmful to the system,
a harm that states legitimately may try to prevent. This conclusion is troub-
ling because, as emphasized by the applicant in Kiss, it stems from the out-
dated view that persons with disabilities are incapable of making competent
decisions.115 Indeed, such misperception is exactly what the CRPD aims to
overcome, and therefore it is decidedly unclear whether the ECtHR’s justifi-
cation would prevail under an analysis grounded in the CRPD.
In theory, it is possible to reconcile these two inapposite views if it is
acknowledged that the state can take account of incapable voters when de-
signing public policies to enable their participation, but not with the pur-
pose of disenfranchising them. Enactment of public policies (such as
providing disabled (and other) people with assistance and educating disabled
voters to increase their competence when dealing with political issues) is
certainly less worrying from a disability rights perspective, while still fur-
thering the aim articulated in Kiss. Be that as it may, until the ECtHR’s
argumentation is explicitly overruled or put into doubt by other bodies,
especially the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, it re-
mains the only explicit ruling on this point. In the absence of decisions
holding the contrary, international human rights law does not currently pre-
vent states from protecting the integrity of their electoral systems from inca-
pable voters. The existence of a legitimate aim does not, however,
automatically permit those states to disenfranchise incapable voters with
disabilities. To do so, the applied measure must also be necessary and pro-
portionate to its stated aim.116
112. See ECHR, supra note 16, art. 3 and arts. 8, 9, 10, 11.
113. See ECHR, supra note 16, art. 3; Kiss, supra note 7, ¶ 38.
114. Kiss, supra note 7, ¶ 38.
115. Id. ¶ 28.
116. The proportionality test was articulated by the ECHR in the Belgian Linguistic Case, which held
that differential treatment in the exercise of a right guaranteed in the ECHR must establish a reasonable
relationship of proportionality in the means employed and the aim sought to be realized. Case “Relating
to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium” v. Belgium, App. Nos.
1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 252 (1968).
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ii. The Principle of Proportionality
“Necessity” and “proportionality” are not separate criteria in the
ECtHR’s analysis—indeed, they are usually intermingled and considered to-
gether117—and so the Court’s proportionality analysis is wider than simply
assessing the measure’s over-inclusiveness.118 Along the same lines, the
ECtHR utilizes several criteria uncommon to other judicial forums119 and
assesses a number of factors that are referred to differently than in other
international human rights systems.120 Consequently, for this analysis, we
work within the ECtHR’s scope.
A state’s disenfranchisement of voters on the premise of protecting its
electoral system presumes that incapable voters are in fact exercising their
right to vote. As an initial matter, the entire population of persons that
could even conceivably be catalogued as incapable voters is miniscule. In
Hungary, for instance, the entire population of persons potentially suffering
from a “severe” or “profound” intellectual disability is less than 12,000
people, or about 0.15% of all voters.121 Of these individuals, some, like
those persons in coma-like conditions, will be practically unable to exercise
their legal capacity if given the opportunity. Other groups identified above,
such as persons in later stages of dementia, those undergoing an acute
psychotic attack or those with significant intellectual disabilities, may be
physically able to cast a ballot, but given that even capable persons with
disabilities vote in smaller numbers than the general population122—and
that the category of incapable voters is restricted to those so stringently
disabled that they cannot be accommodated reasonably during the process of
voting—it is highly doubtful that individuals in these groups would in fact
vote if given the opportunity. Therefore, systemic electoral legitimacy is not
117. See, e.g., Olsson v. Sweden, App. No. 10465/83, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 259, 285 (1989).
118. For a general description of proportionality, see Aharon Barak, Proportionality and Principled Bal-
ancing, 4 L. & Ethics of Hum. Rts. 3, 6 (2010). The European Court’s proportionality analysis overlaps
with Barak’s proportionality in the regular sense, which is wider than proportionality stricto sensu.
119. For example, the European Court’s proportionality analysis is intertwined with principle of sub-
sidiarity. On their relationship, see generally Jonas Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportional-
ity, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights, 3.
120. For example, the principle of subsidiarity is embodied by the European Court’s margin of appre-
ciation doctrine, and is part of its proportionality analysis. Cf. supra note 109. Christoffersen identifies
several areas where the European Court engages in proportionality analysis under different names. See
Christoffersen, supra note 119, at 83–94.
121. Bass estimates the number of people living with severe and multiple disabilities in Hungary is
between 8,000 and 12,000. See Bass La´szlo´, Jelente´s a su´lyosan, halmozottan fogyate´kos embereket nevelo˜ csala´dok
e´letko¨ru¨lme´nyeiro˜l [Report on the living circumstances of families raising persons with severe, combined
disabilities], 1, 49 (Ke´zenfogva Alapı´tva´ny 2004).
122. Persons with disabilities as a whole also vote in smaller ratios than the general population. See,
e.g., Inclusion Europe, Recommendations for Accessible Elections in Europe 3 (2011), available at http://e-in-
clude.eu/images/stories/Policy_Recommendations_EN.pdf (reporting that 31.5% of persons with intel-
lectual disability voted in the 2010 UK elections compared to 65.1% of the general population; 20% of
persons with intellectual disability voted in the 1998 Swedish elections compared to 81.4% of the gen-
eral population; and 31% of persons with intellectual disability voted in the 1994 Swedish national
elections compared to 86% of the general population).
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a very compelling ground for affirmatively disenfranchising these
individuals.
By contrast, studies indicate that up to three percent of all votes are cast
in error123 and that the percentage of “irrational” votes—for instance, those
who close their eyes and choose randomly—is even higher.124 Thus, any
gains to the legitimacy of a state’s electoral system associated with disabil-
ity-based restrictions of the kind considered in Kiss are marginal at best.
Although such measures may protect the electoral system from a very small
subset of incapable voters, they do not address the much larger voting popu-
lation of irrational persons without disabilities.
Furthermore, it is unclear how allowing for incapable voters in fact harms
the system. If it is because incapable voters do not rationally evaluate the
best likely outcome of their electoral selections, many of the otherwise capa-
ble non-disabled voters are guilty of the same offense. Persons who vote
based on family traditions or a candidate’s hairstyle harm the system in a
similar way. It is therefore troubling that states take the time and expense to
disenfranchise incapable voters, yet care little about irrational voters even
though they harm the electoral system in a similar way. Since all incapable
voters as a factual matter are also persons with disabilities, the targeted ap-
proach applied by states gives rise to the obvious objection of discrimina-
tion. It is also insufficient to aver that irrationality is a matter of choice by
those who are otherwise capable of being rational, whereas incapacity is in-
herent. As shown by philosopher Jason Brennan, irrational voters (whom he
refers to as “bad voters”) are irrational for a reason.125 In Brennan’s view,
irrational voters do not have the skills necessary for efficient voting because
mastering them was not worth their while.126 They thus cannot choose to
vote rationally, and states cannot rely on this distinction.127
A more convincing justification of the differential treatment of these two
categories of voters, however, would maintain that although states are una-
ble to identify irrational voters, they can identify incapable voters. States
might further aver that this divergence exists because, whereas there is no
objective test to assess the rationality of voters’ bases for decisionmaking,128
123. See Ted Selker, The Technology of Access: Allowing People of Age to Vote for Themselves, 38 McGeorge
L. Rev. 1113, 1113 (2007) (“between one-half and three percent of voter selections on a typical ballot
are actually for an adjacent selection”); cf. Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 Harv. J.
Legis. 265, 274 (2007) (discussing common mistakes that lead to voting errors as illustrated by the
2000 presidential and 2006 congressional elections in Florida).
124. Jason Brennan, The Ethics of Voting 164 (2011) (“Among people in the lowest knowledge
quartile, only 12.2 percent and 9.7 percent knew which party controlled the [American] House of Repre-
sentatives and Senate, respectively. The bottom 25 percent of citizens does worse than a coin flip when it
comes to political knowledge—they are systematically in error.”).
125. Id. at 174.
126. See id. at 165.
127. Id. at 169.
128. Id. at 108.
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there are tests to establish “voting capacity.”129 Although that much is true,
the argument is fatally flawed because voting capacity tests are not entirely
accurate at identifying incapable voters and therefore always exclude some
capable ones.130 In fact, psychiatric experts agree that such evaluations are
not exclusively based on objective criteria, but rely on policy and social
prejudice as well.131 Hence, denying persons with disabilities the right to
cast a ballot on the basis of voting capacity tests is an over-inclusive measure
because it excludes some capable voters.
Nor is it sufficient to note, albeit correctly, that some amount of over-
inclusion is permissible under international law.132 There are indeed eligibil-
ity criteria, such as requirements to reach the age of majority or relocation to
a new voting district before the voter registration deadline.133 However,
these examples differ from the disenfranchisement of capable voters. Age
and residency are not suspect classifications under international law, and
therefore exclusions predicated on membership in these categories are tech-
nically permissible.134 Capacity assessments, however, affect only persons
with disabilities and discrimination based on disability is explicitly prohib-
ited by the CRPD135 and recognized as an impermissible ground for dis-
crimination by the ECtHR.136 Therefore, any unjustified over-inclusion in
the case of capacity assessments is an impermissible classification. The argu-
ment that targeting is permissible when grounded in objective criteria,
which we agree with above, will also fail. It would lead to unjustly exclud-
ing at least some capable disabled persons, which no objective reason can
justify. Because some amount of misidentification of capable disabled per-
129. See, e.g., Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The
Effect of Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 McGeorge L. Rev. 931 (2007) (describing the
Competence Assessment Tool for Voting, or CAT-V); Raymond Raad et al., The Capacity to Vote of Persons
with Serious Mental Illness, 60 Psychiatric Services 624, 625 (2009).
130. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 129, at 962 (“There is no scientifically determinable point on
that spectrum at which we can say the person manifests sufficient capacity for the task.”); Kohn, supra
note 86, at 1083 (asserting the significant likelihood that individuals tested by CAT-V will be incor-
rectly assessed as lacking the capacity to vote); Raad et al., supra note 129, at 624.
131. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, “I Vote, I Count”: Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 51 Psychi-
atric Services 849, 850 (2000) (“It seems likely that popular attitudes towards the mentally dis-
abled—seeing them as intrinsically irrational and incapable of participating in civil functions—play an
important role.”); Karlawish & Bonnie, supra note 99, at 884 (noting that traditional explanations claim-
ing that certain persons should be excluded from voting because their intellectual disabilities are incom-
patible with making informed and rational choices are increasingly regarded as discriminatory).
132. See, e.g., Horych v. Poland, No. 13621/08, ¶ 93 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Apr. 17, 2012), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110440 (providing an example of a prison special
security regime that was classified as over-inclusive, but nevertheless worthy of further consideration by
the ECtHR).
133. Mass. Gen. Laws ch., 51 § 1F (2012) (stating that, in Massachusetts, registration is allowed until
20 days before elections).
134. ECHR, supra note 16, art. 14 (listing precluded grounds).
135. CRPD, supra note 4, art. 12.
136. Glor v. Switzerland, No. 13444/04 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Apr. 30, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-92525 (the first case in which the ECtHR recognized disability as
a status covered by Article 14, the ECHR’s anti-discrimination provision); Kiss, supra note 7 (elevated
disability to a suspect classification).
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sons as incapable is an unavoidable consequence of any capacity assess-
ment,137 such assessments are always disproportionate, and so cannot be
permitted under international law.
It also bears repeating that the practical application of individualized ca-
pacity assessments is far bleaker than the situation described above in ab-
stract theoretical terms. Rather than beginning from a departure point of an
even-handed application of scientifically sound assessment tools, the history
of disenfranchisement of persons with disabilities—which has affected how
they are perceived by society at large, including by those professionals ad-
ministering and reviewing the tests—has been one of prejudice and stigma
leading to grossly disproportionate exclusion from voting.138 Returning to
the example of Hungary, although between 8,000 and 12,000 persons could
be classified as having “severe” or “profound” disabilities such that their
voting capacity could conceivably be disputed,139 as of 2011, 71,862 persons
were under guardianship and legally excluded from the right to vote for lack
of capacity.140 Under a liberal reading of Kiss, all persons from the latter
category can undergo an individualized assessment to establish whether
their right to vote should be reinstated, and are presumed incapable until
that time.141 Given the scientifically unreliable nature of these assess-
ments,142 as well as Hungary’s interest in validating its procedures to protect
the electoral system, it is very likely that most of those currently disen-
franchised will remain so after the assessments. Even if we consider the
Hungarian example extreme, capacity assessments are almost certain to pro-
duce similarly distorted results elsewhere. For example, the CRPD monitor-
ing committee reached a similar conclusion regarding Spain, remarking that
continued exclusion after an individualized assessment “appears to be the
rule and not the exception.”143
What is more, even if strict scientific methodology existed to mitigate
the problem of over-exclusion resulting from state-sponsored individualized
assessments, it would still founder from a human rights perspective. Interna-
tional bodies are simply not in a good position to police assessment proce-
137. See generally Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 129.
138. See CRPD Committee Concluding Observations Spain, supra note 19, ¶ 47.
139. See Bass, supra note 121, at 49.
140. Letter No. 10586/2011/2 from Dr. Benedek Judit, OIT Hiv., Office of the Nat’l Judiciary
Council (March 18, 2011) (on file with authors) (on the number of persons under guardianship).
141. Letter No. 4/2011, from Miklo´s Solte´sz, Minister of State for Social, Family and Youth Affairs,
on behalf of the Hungarian government to the Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (May
31, 2012) (on file with authors) (observations in communication).
142. See generally Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 129.
143. See CRPD Committee Concluding Observations, Spain, supra note 19, ¶ 47 (“[The Committee]
is further concerned that the deprivation of this right appears to be the rule and not the exception. It
regrets the lack of information on standards of evidence or grounds, and criteria used by judges when
depriving persons of their right to vote. It notes with concern the number of persons with disabilities
denied their right to vote.”).
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dures.144 Since prejudice against persons with disabilities is an important
factor in individualized assessments of capacity to vote and distorts their
outcomes, they should be avoided at all costs and replaced with clear rules
that limit the scope of individual discretion. Because other alternatives, such
as those based on guardianship, are clearly off the table following Kiss, the
only viable possibility to curtail prejudiced assessments is to not disen-
franchise anyone on the basis of lack of capacity.
Finally, under a proportionality analysis, states are required to demon-
strate that they considered a “less restrictive alternative.”145 Central Euro-
pean states, including Hungary, produce hugely over-inflated numbers of
incapacitated persons, where the major reason for deprivation of capacity
seems to be the mere presence of disability.146 Historically, these individuals
have been excluded from elections and not provided accessible or easy-to-
read information about political processes in general or political parties in
particular.147 States truly concerned by the competence of the electorate—
those with and without disabilities—would meet their duty to educate and
inform voters instead of excluding them. Providing information, opportuni-
ties to learn by practice, and facilitation better ensures that persons with
disabilities cast competent votes, fulfilling the same legitimate state aim
through less restrictive means. Moreover, such measures help to satisfy the
duty to accommodate voters with disabilities—and others—who require as-
sistance in order to access their right to vote and participate in the political
life of their communities.
III. The Voting-Incapable and Proxy Voting
Part II argued that the disenfranchisement of persons with disabilities is
disproportionate under international human rights law because it unjustly
discriminates against some disabled people with intact voting capacity.
Hence, exclusion from the right to vote based on disability, guardianship, or
an individual assessment of voting capacity is impermissible under interna-
144. See Shtukaturov v. Russia, No. 44009/05, ¶ 95 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Mar. 27, 2008), (explaining
the lack of direct contact between the European Court and persons whose legal capacity is assessed calls
for judicial restraint in overruling the results of such assessments).
145. See, e.g., Witold Litwa v. Poland, App. No. 26629/95, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000).
146. See, for example, the guardianship reports of the Mental Disability Advocacy Center: Guardian-
ship and Human Rights in Bulgaria, Mental Disability Advocacy Center (2007); Mental Disability
Advocacy Center, Guardianship and Human Rights in the Czech Republic, Mental Disability Advocacy
Center (2007); Guardianship and Human Rights in Georgia, Mental Disability Advocacy Center
(2007); Guardianship and Human Rights in Hungary, Mental Disability Advocacy Center (2007);
Guardianship and Human Rights in Russia, Mental Disability Advocacy Center (2007); Guardianship
and Human Rights in Serbia, Mental Disability Advocacy Center (2006).
147. See, e.g., Deprivation of the Right to Vote Affects People with Intellectual Disabilities Across Europe, e-
Include, (Sept. 24, 2010, 4:18 PM), http://www.e-include.eu/en/articles/630-deprivation-of-the-right-
to-vote-affects-people-with-intellectual-disabilities-across-europe (“[I]t is clear that people with intellec-
tual disabilities under guardianship are still denied the right to vote in several countries in Europe
without any assessment of their actual ability to vote.”).
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tional law. Such a conclusion signals significant progress for the vast major-
ity of persons with disabilities presently barred from voting in Europe and
elsewhere, but does it go far enough toward protecting the full enjoyment of
the human right to political participation for individuals with disabilities?
To comply with their international human rights obligations, and in partic-
ular with the CRPD’s progressive mandates, states must provide support for
persons to exercise suffrage. Nevertheless a small percentage of persons with
disabilities, even with reasonable accommodations, will remain unable to
participate in elections. Despite being legally entitled to vote, they func-
tionally cannot vote. Accordingly, this Part considers a bold proposal by
political philosopher Martha Nussbaum in which voting-incapable persons
with disabilities would have their guardians cast votes on their behalf.148
Because proxy voting violates international human rights and also engenders
profound disadvantages, the status quo situation described in Part II,
whereby those who cannot vote do not vote, is preferred.
A. Capability and “Cognitive” Disability
Building on concepts first enunciated by Nobel prize-winning economist
Amartya Sen,149 Nussbaum crafted a capabilities approach grounded in no-
tions of justice and equality to delineate the obligations states have to their
own citizens, with particular reference to those with intellectual (she uses
the term “cognitive”) disabilities.150 Nussbaum’s capabilities approach cre-
ates a fertile space within which to understand the reach and content of the
human right to development. It enumerates ten capabilities for which states
must make resources available so that individuals can have the agency, if
they so choose, to increase their personal capabilities to a minimum thresh-
old level.151
Control over one’s political environment via meaningful participation is
one of the ten capabilities Nussbaum listed in her earlier work;152 her cur-
rent proposal more fully articulates this capability in the context of individ-
uals with intellectual disabilities as a means of ensuring their equal respect
148. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Capabilities of People with Cognitive Disabilities, 40 Metaphilosophy
331 (July 2009) [hereinafter Cognitive Disabilities].
149. See generally Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (1999); Amartya K. Sen, Development as
Capability Expansion, in Human Development and the International Development Strategy
for the 1990s 94 (Keith Griffin & John Knight eds., 1990).
150. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Spe-
cies Membership (2006) [hereinafter Frontiers]; Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human De-
velopment: The Capabilities Approach (2000) [hereinafter Capabilities Approach]. The more
recent of these books also extends Nussbaum’s theory to the realms of state obligations to other states and
to non-human animals, both of which lie beyond the scope of this Article. For detailed elaborations and
critiques of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, see Lord & Stein, supra note 55.
151. The ten capabilities Nussbaum deems vital to a full human experience are: life; bodily health;
bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species;
play; and control over one’s political environment and material surroundings. See Capabilities Ap-
proach, supra note 150, at 78–80.
152. Id. at 80.
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and dignity.153 Within the realm of voting,154 Nussbaum differentiates be-
tween three sub-groups of individuals with intellectual disabilities based on
their characteristics. Group A members can vote with the assistance of rea-
sonable accommodations; those in Group B cannot vote by themselves but
can express a preference which their guardians can execute on their behalf;
and Group C constituents can neither form a view on political issues for
themselves nor communicate their choices to others.155 Nussbaum indicates
that the case for people from Groups A and B voting is “easy” in theory but
nonetheless challenges the attitudes and norms of state implementers,156 a
position that accords with our analyses in Part II.157
As for Group C (the voting-incapable), Nussbaum suggests that to satisfy
the principles of equal respect and dignity in the area of political rights,
states must authorize guardians to vote on behalf and in the interests of
persons from that category.158 Acknowledging that this proposal invokes “a
surprising and controversial use of notions of guardianship,” Nussbaum as-
serts that such arrangements are nevertheless essential for realizing the full
equality of persons with intellectual disabilities.159 By contrast, we favor the
status quo, maintaining that such persons from Group C ought not to be
disenfranchised nor to have a guardian exercise decisionmaking in their
stead.
B. Human Rights and Substitute Decisionmaking
Nussbaum’s proposal on behalf of the voting-incapable is facially appeal-
ing as it guarantees exercise of the franchise to the population of persons
with disabilities who cannot be accommodated in the electoral process.
153. Id. at 337. Much of what Nussbaum argues, and how we respond, applies equally to “voting-
incapable” persons without intellectual disabilities. See discussion identifying groups in Part IIC(i). We
therefore underscore that our references to person with intellectual disabilities is intended only to engage
Nussbaum on her own terms, and not to lessen the similar nature of our conclusions for other
individuals.
154. The proposal also extends to for-proxy jury service, a topic outside our current analysis, but one
on which we would reach similar conclusions. In the event, Nussbaum explains that her earlier engage-
ment with John Rawls in Frontiers of Justice was an attempt to put forward a capabilities theory as
progressive as Rawls’s theory of justice in all spheres he covered, and to improve on the areas where he
acknowledged shortcomings regarding persons with disabilities, the interactions between states, and
non-human animals. See Cognitive Disabilities, supra note 148, at 337–41. Nussbaum also explains that the
arguments in Frontiers of Justice delved into areas of economic and social rights, hence her desire to
return for an extended explication to the realm of civil and political rights. Id. at 340.
155. Id. at 344–45. The division between Groups B and C does not precisely coincide with differences
between capable and incapable individuals. Depending on the test used, some persons in Group B can be
found incapable. However, since the exact criteria for incapacity is not a main concern for this analysis,
we put these nuances aside and adopt the division suggested by Nussbaum.
156. Id. at 345–46.
157. A notable divergence is that Nussbaum grounds the legal basis for her assertions in American
constitutional law, which she justifies through social contract ideals. By contrast, this Article derives its
conclusions from human rights law and norms. Ultimately, we agree as to the disposition of Members of
Groups A and B, but disagree as to Group C.
158. Cognitive Disabilities, supra note 148, at 347.
159. Id. at 333.
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Nonetheless, it must be rejected for violating international human rights
norms, for undermining the inherent dignity of persons with cognitive disa-
bilities, and for failing in practice for several reasons, including those given
in Part II.
i. Substitution versus Assistance
As an initial matter, it bears mentioning that the application of general
international human rights principles makes clear that a right cannot be
exercised by another person in the substituted manner proposed.160 Indeed, a
good deal of the negotiation and impetus for the CRPD evolved as a re-
sponse to exactly this type of substituted decisionmaking having comprised
the historical (and tragically, continuing) case for persons with disabili-
ties.161 The consequences of substituted decisionmaking for persons with
disabilities have ranged from lack of control over their financial matters to
involuntary sterilization to lifelong confinement in institutions created for
their benefit and paternalistic “care.”162
Correspondingly, Article 12 of the CRPD acknowledges the equal legal
capacity of persons with disabilities, and requires that state parties under-
take appropriate measures to support individuals in exercising that legal
capacity.163 Article 12 thus establishes a supported decisionmaking frame-
work to create conditions within which decisionmaking can occur free of
coercion and undue influence. This approach preserves and enables auton-
omy by recognizing that persons with disabilities are inherently equal
agents and holders of rights. Supported decisionmaking models, according
to this mandate, must empower persons with disabilities to exercise their
agency across a wide array of legal transactions and social encounters,164 and
states, as we saw in Kiss, are banned from using guardianship and other
devices as heuristics for exclusion.
Nussbaum’s proposal clearly runs afoul of basic disability human rights
norms including autonomy, dignity, and respect for the individual—pre-
cisely, and ironically, the values she seeks to honor. Lying at the center of
this disjuncture between social contract ideals as espoused by Nussbaum and
commonly held disability rights concepts is the divide that separates facili-
tated decisionmaking from substituted decisionmaking. In summary, an as-
sistant does not decide on behalf of another person but instead supports an
160. See Lord & Stein, supra note 55.
161. See Michael Ashley Stein et al., Equal Access to Health Care under the U.N. Disability Rights Conven-
tion, in Medicine and Social Justice: Essays on the Distribution and Care 245 (Rosamond
Rhodes et al. eds., 2012).
162. Disability Rights International (formerly Mental Disability Rights International) has docu-
mented egregious human rights violations against persons with disabilities in institutional settings, such
as orphanages, social care homes, and psychiatric hospitals. See Disability Rights International,
http://www.disabilityrightsintl.org/media-gallery/our-reports-publications/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
163. CRPD, supra note 4, art. 12.
164. See Lord & Stein, supra note 55.
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individual in arriving at a conclusion and/or executing that person’s own
choice (with the supported individuals belonging to Groups A and B). By
contrast, a substitute decisionmaker such as a guardian makes a decision on
behalf of another person (here, the members of Group C).165 No doubt a
guardian can and should take the preferences and wishes of the person under
his aegis into account, but the decision ultimately remains that of the
guardian.166
While there is some debate over the validity of substitute decisionmaking
in extreme circumstances of life and death or causing irreparable harm to
one’s self,167 no such harm is envisioned in the case of voting. There are no
extraordinary circumstances requiring the creation of an exception to the
general ‘no substitution’ principle on which the CRPD is built.168
ii. Voting, Respect, and Dignity
Nussbaum justifies her proposal on the ground that the right to vote
“must be delivered on the basis of equality if the nation in question is to
claim even minimal justice,”169 a conclusion with which we agree. However,
the analogue she delivers in support, that denying a voting-incapable person
with a disability the opportunity to vote through a guardian is the same as
excluding voting-capable women and African-Americans,170 is inapposite.
We are not equal because we vote. We are equal because we are allowed to
vote, and there is a difference between these two propositions. Many women
and African-Americans—as well as men and members of other racial
groups—do not vote. That does not diminish society’s respect towards them
because such approbation is contingent upon their holding the right to vote.
To subordinate their status, a state would have to disenfranchise the group.
165. See Amita Dhanda, Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or
Lodestar for the Future?, 34 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 429, 433–34 (2007).
166. Parenthetically, although not specifically cited by Nussbaum, her proposal seems to attempt to
either extend or supersede an argument made by philosopher Eva Kittay that family caregivers (who are
not necessarily guardians, but often are, and certainly could be guardians) ought to have extra votes
because they serve not only their own interests, but those of the people with cognitive disabilities to
whom they have familial attachments, and thus can contribute to democratic goals of representation and
accountability. See generally Eva Feder Kittay, Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and
Dependency (1998). Notably, yet another philosopher (and parent of a person with an intellectual
disability), Michael Berube, rejected Nussbaum’s proposal as not advancing an equality agenda. See
Michael Berube, Equality, Freedom, and/or Justice for All? A Response to Martha Nussbaum, in Cognitive
Disability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy 97 (Eva Feder Kittay & Licia Carlson eds.,
2010).
167. See generally Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws (Bernadette McSherry & Pe-
nelope Weller eds., 2010); Peter Bartlett, Oliver Lewis & Oliver Thorold, Mental Disability
and the European Convention on Human Rights (2006).
168. Shantha Rau Barriga, From Paternalism to Dignity: Respecting the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
Human Rights Watch (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/paternalism-
dignity.
169. Cognitive Disabilities, supra note 148, at 343.
170. Id.
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More to the point, voting by proxy is not the same as voting alone or
voting with assistance when it comes to expressing equal respect for voting-
incapable persons with disabilities or promoting their dignity. This is true
for three main reasons. First, although disenfranchised persons can no doubt
feel ostracized, proxy voting is unlikely to improve their self-esteem. Those
who are unable to form a political preference might not realistically be ex-
pected to have a self-conception of political community. Second, proxy vot-
ing on behalf of a miniscule minority (recall that in Hungary, these persons
constitute 0.15% of all votes at most) will have doubtful, if any, impact on
politicians being more responsive to the social choices expressed.171 This is
especially true because it is the guardians who are in fact voting and articu-
lating political preferences, and politicians are already taking their prefer-
ences into account.172 Third, proxy voting diminishes the dignity of persons
with disabilities before third parties because it sends a clear signal to the
social environment that the individual is flawed and, in the Hungarian gov-
ernment’s words, not capable “of making conscious and judicious deci-
sions.”173 In fact, disenfranchised persons with disabilities—including the
applicant in Kiss174—raise the issue of such stigma as a crucial reason for
seeking reinstatement of their right to vote.175
If anything, proxy voting further subordinates the voting-incapable.
These individuals are already stigmatized on account of their disabilities,
and the appointment of a guardian to vote on their behalf highlights their
lower social status to their communities. Without such judicial interven-
tion, an outside observer would not be able to tell with certainty whether an
individual did not vote because she did not want to, or because she was
unable. In terms of dignity, this is preferable to being identified as a person
whose vote counted only because she is so disabled that a court prohibited
her from voting and appointed a guardian to do so in her stead.176
171. A more effective strategy would encourage persons with disabilities capable of voting to do so,
since they currently vote in much lower numbers than the general population. See Inclusion Europe,
supra note 122 (citing differential data).
172. We underscore that in many countries the reality is very different from this hypothetical aca-
demic discourse. Large numbers of otherwise voting-capable persons with disabilities are disenfranchised
and it matters hugely for them whether they can express their political choice directly or have to rely on
family members or others who might have contradictory interests. By contrast, persons under guardian-
ship are likely to be represented only to the extent that their interests do not collide seriously with those
of their guardians.
173. Kiss, supra note 7, ¶ 25.
174. Kiss took the trouble of undergoing four years of litigation because his family members referred
to his inability to vote as proof of his “serious disability” and “inability to take care of himself.” Personal
communication with A. Kiss (on file with author).
175. See Hungarian Civil Liberties Union [Ta´rsasa´g a Szabadsa´gjogoke´rt, TASZ], Va´laszto´jog e´s fogy-
ate´kossa´g [Suffrage and Disability], (last accessed Nov. 17, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
PBgao8ZklGY.
176. The appointment of a guardian presupposes the restriction of the represented person’s own right
to vote, as we explained in Part III.B.iii.
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iii. Proxy Voting in Practice
Proxy voting by guardians on behalf of individuals in Group C requires
the state to identify persons in Group C, and that invariably leads to the
unjust exclusion problems outlined in Part II. Moreover, the abuses Nuss-
baum correctly identifies in other areas where guardians act on behalf of
persons with disabilities militates for less, rather than more, substituted
decisionmaking.
In order for guardians to cast ballots on behalf of Group C members, the
state must first identify voting-incapable persons and restrict their franchise
to avoid both the guardian and the represented person voting on the latter’s
behalf. This raises no problems for the theoretical world in which Nussbaum
posits her proposal, for only voting-incapable persons will be connected with
guardians to act on their behalf. However, as detailed in Part II, the state is
unable in practice to precisely ascertain those who are incapable of voting.
Consequently, some percentage of voting-capable persons with disabilities
will be disenfranchised and have their basic human right to equal political
participation precipitously violated.
Furthermore, and as Nussbaum acknowledges, even in imagined societies
with well-functioning guardianship systems, the process of proxy voting it-
self allows for some corruption in which guardians do not vote in the real
interests of their charges.177 Nussbaum has no doubt that such abuses can
and do happen—as she puts it, “what else is new?”178—but in her view
voting misuse is no different from other areas where guardians mishandle
their positions, such as the disposal of property and entering into of con-
tracts.179 Contrary to her suggestion, the situation is more serious in the case
of voting. Compared to other areas of guardianship, the state cannot feasibly
make a timely inquiry—before the vote is counted—into the relationship
between the person with a disability and her proxy voting guardian. In real-
ity, what happens in the voting booth usually remains in the voting booth,
and objective outsiders such as courts cannot know for certain what role the
guardian played in establishing or representing the person’s choice. Absen-
tee voting procedures and technical devices allowing for voting away from
the polls further shield these human rights violations from scrutiny. Since
no one else need be present when the ballot is marked, guardians can more
easily abuse their positions.
Indeed, given the overuse of guardianship in many jurisdictions,180 there
is even more reason to limit the scope of power given to guardians. If states
could satisfy the requirement of equality by allowing proxy voting, other-
177. Cognitive Disabilities, supra note 148, at 347.
178. Id. at 348.
179. Id. at 347.
180. For an overview of human rights violations associated with guardianship and their prevalence,
see Legal Capacity Reports, Mental Disability Advocacy Center, http://www.mdac.info/en/resources?goal
=137&format=144&page=1 (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
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wise capable persons with disabilities would likely find themselves deprived
of the possibility of expressing their political choices. In fact, states would
have a strong incentive to subject increasingly more persons to proxy voting
because they consider guardians better educated and more knowledgeable
than voters with disabilities. Under this instrumental view of voting, in
which the person’s best vote is the one that promotes the best outcome,181 it
would make sense to increase the “competence” of those casting votes via
guardianship arrangements and thereby better protect the integrity of the
political process. Thus, the same political motivations that currently result
in disenfranchisement of persons with disabilities could easily lead to limit-
ing their right to vote by subjecting them to proxy voting under the guise
of “respect for equality.”182
In sum, Nussbaum’s proposal raises many serious disadvantages relative
to the status quo position enunciated in Part II without adding any advan-
tages. We should not introduce the concept of substitute decisionmaking to
voting and incur both per se human rights violations and possible guardian-
ship abuses. We rather maintain that the current situation in which those
who cannot vote do not vote is preferable.
Conclusion
This Article argued that the fundamental right to vote cannot be cur-
tailed on the basis of an alleged lack of capacity by persons with disabilities.
Although the ECtHR’s landmark decision in Kiss might be viewed as leav-
ing that possibility open, we demonstrated that disenfranchisement based on
individual assessment is disproportionate because it unjustly excludes a cer-
tain number of voting-capable individuals. Since all those affected are per-
sons with disabilities, such state action violates the requirement of equality
expressed in general international human rights law that recently was ex-
plicitly extended to cover disability. States concerned with the integrity of
their electoral systems should pursue that goal by alternative means, most
importantly by providing education and facilitation to persons with disabili-
ties (and others) to exercise their franchise.
Further, although a small number of individuals cannot currently be ac-
commodated in the electoral process, this also does not justify their disen-
franchisement. Nor does it warrant a more intrusive measure, such as voting
by proxy, as was suggested by philosopher Martha Nussbaum. That proposal
has few advantages while also raising serious concerns about respecting the
dignity of persons with disabilities. Instead, the status quo situation should
181. An elaborate defense of the instrumental concept of voting is set forth by Brennan, supra note
124.
182. Taken to its logical consequence, this instrumental view would be decidedly undemocratic, with
only the wisest few (whether with or without disabilities) making important decisions on behalf of their
broader societies. Id.
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remain and those who cannot vote—even with facilitation in the form of
reasonable accommodations—should not vote, and in no circumstance
should this situation justify singling out voting-incapable persons from
other individuals or categorizing them differently before the law.
Significantly, the exercise of voting rights is only one subset of a larger
framework and debate regarding the equal exercise of legal capacity by per-
sons with disabilities. The solutions derived within this specific realm may
not necessarily be applicable in other contexts where the stake for the indi-
vidual (including the nature of possible eventual harm) varies. Nevertheless,
our discussion provides valuable insight into the application of recognized
international human rights principles concerning the equal recognition of
legal capacity. This Article should therefore inform more general debates on
how legal rules concerning the exercise of legal capacity should further,
rather than hinder, the equal respect and dignity of persons with disabilities.
